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CASE STUDY: NIGERIA 
By Quinn Johnson 
INTRODUCTION 
I n this era of globalization, relationships between institutions, organizations, and individuals have achieved unprecedented 
connectivity worldwide. While producing both positive and 
negative outcomes, the vast majority of these interactions are 
nonviolent in nature. In some cases, however, the impacts of 
globalization colliding with traditional cultures and their val-
ues have resulted in violent extremism. While such extremism 
can be observed in many different states worldwide, igeria 
presents a particularly interesting case. 
Though vastly different in character, two ongoing con-
flicts in igeria, the Boko Haram Insurgency and the iger 
Delta Conflict, can both be considered responses to certain 
aspects of globalization. Using the Method of Agreement 
to find commonalities which may contribute to understand-
ing broader trends, this paper will examine extremism as a 
backlash against globalization, a framework developed by 
Australian military strategist and counterinsurgency expert 
David Kilcullen in his book The Accidental Guerilla. 1 
As explained by Kilcullen, negative response to the cul-
tural, economic, and political dominance of Western ide-
als and values is a unifying thread between many disparate 
extremist groups and conflicts worldwide and, indeed, is 
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an organizing principle for many of 
them. 2 In addition, the wildly uneven 
economic effects of globalization have 
created international classes of haves 
and have-nots. The have-nots are dis-
enfranchised and are, thanks to glo-
balized news media, fully aware of the 
luxurious lives that the emerging class 
of global elites enjoy at their expense. 
As a result, there is a strong tenden-
cy to blame this condition-often not 
incorrectly-on the economic forces 
of globalization which are inextricably 
linked to the West. 3 While K.ilcullen's 
model is certainly not a comprehen-
sive theory for analyzing every ex-
tremist group, it does provide a useful 
framework for evaluating whether an 
actor's behavior can be explained by 
the economic and cultural impacts of 
Western-led globalization on their im-
mediate environment. 
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BOKO HARAM 
The most infamous extremism associated with 
igeria is the terrorist group Boko Haram. Their 
name roughly translates to "Western Education is 
Forbidden'' as their ideology objects to the influ-
ence of Western secular values on Nigeria which 
the extremist group seeks to replace with radi-
cal Islamic theocracy under Sharia law. Found-
ed in 2002 as a nonviolent religious movement, 
Boko Haram evolved into a violent insurgency 
after an initial clash with state security forces in 
2009, a conflict which resulted in their founder, 
Mohammed Yusuf, being arrested and publicly 
executed by the Nigerian Police. The group rose 
to international attention in 2014 following 
their kidnapping of 276 Nigerian schoolgirls 
from the village of Chibok, with the resulting 
viral "Bring Back Our Girls" campaign making 
Boko Haram a household name in the West.3 
The motivations and goals of Boko Haram 
are best understood by examining the impact 
of globalization on igerian demographics. 
In igeria, there is a rough parity between the 
Christian (49.3%) and Muslim (48.8%) popula-
tions, although the presence of syncretism with 
indigenous religions creates a significant margin 
of error.5 Since 1953, the country's religious fac-
tions have experienced sporadic violence, with re-
ligious identities being a significant factor in the 
infamous Nigerian Civil War ( 196 7-1970) over 
Biafran secession.6 The predominantly Christian 
south contains the most economically prosperous 
regions, including the megacity Lagos ( the city 
with the highest GDP in Africa) and the oil-
rich Niger Delta. Conversely, the primarily Mus-
lim north, where Boko Haram is based, has not 
benefited nearly as much from the economic de-
velopment brought about by globalization.7 De-
spite igeria's status as Africa's largest economy, 
around 44% of its 198 million inhabitants live in 
extreme poverty, leading it to surpass India for the 
dubious distinction of country with the most ex-
tremely poor people. 8 This unequal development 
I 
GLOBALIZATION: 
Globalization refers to the growing interdependence 
of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, 
brought about by cross-border trade in goods and 
services. technology, and flows of investment, people, 
and information 
(Peterson Institute for International Economics). 
METHOD OF AGREEMENT: 
A method of scientific induction devised by J. s. Mill 
according to which if two or more instances of a 
phenomenon under investigation have only a single 
circumstance in common the circumstance in which all the 
instances agree is the cause or effect of the phenomenon 
(Miriam-Webster). 
SHARIA LAW: 
The religious law of Islam is seen as the expression of 
God's command for Muslims and, in application, constitutes 
a system of duties that are incumbent upon all Muslims by 
virtue of their religious belief 
(Encyclopedia Britannica). 
iih&iiil 
The west refers to Euro- America, including Mexico 
and Canada. 
NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: 
Fleeing religious persecution, the Christian lgbo ethnic 
group established the secessionist Republic of Biafra, 
consisting of 9 southeast Nigerian States, in 1967. The 
subsequent 3- year war led to a famine that killed one 
million Biaf rans before Nigeria claimed victory and 
reunited the country in 1970 (History). 
-GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the monetary value of 
all the finished goods and services produced within a 
country's borders in a specific time period 
(lnvestopedia). 
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has created deep resentment within the 
country, especially to the extent that it 
reinforces and inflames existing reli-
gious tensions within the population. 
Boko Haram believe that the un-
equal economic development has em-
powered the country's Christians at the 
expense of the Muslims, who were his-
torically the more powerful faction. As 
a result of this shifting power balance, 
the Christians have been able to imple-
ment conditions such as Western-style 
co-ed education which Boko Haram, 
because of their extremist interpreta-
tion ofislamic ideology, see as intol-
erable. It is perhaps not coincidental 
that Boko Haram's most powerful years 
(2010-2015) coincided with the pres-
idential term of Goodluck Jonathan, a 
Christian from the south.9 
Here, it is important to note that 
efforts to implement Western-style 
education in northern igeria have 
continued under both Muslim and 
Christian regimes. Boko Haram does 
not accurately represent the views of 
an entire religious community or geo-
graphic region; the fact that the infa-
mous schoolgirl kidnapping happened 
in Chibok, a village deep within their 
power base in northeast igeria, clear-
ly illustrates this. till, Boko Haram's 
hatred of Western education, provid-
ing both their name and organizing 
principle, has exponentially intensified 
igeria's continuing cycle of religious 
violence. 
Uneven economic development 
and ongoing religious tension do not 
explain why the igerian government 
continues pushing for girls' education 
in remote areas which are both high-
ly opposed to the idea and difficult to 
govern. Why will the government not 
simply concede the point and grant the 
region greater autonomy in order to 
end the violence? An answer may lie in 
the funding that has financed igeria's 
economic development. As of 2018, 
the igerian government owes $18.9 
billion to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) alone. 10 The IMF lists 
quality education and gender equali-
ty as two of its seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals, adopted from the 
UN .11 The amount of financial leverage 
the IMF holds over igeria doubtlessly 
allows them a voice in how that money 
is spent domestically, in addition to any 
loan conditionalities. 
Regardless of domestic support for 
women's education, to some people 
the mere existence of this relationship 
means any progress in the field of ed-
ucation will be irreparably tainted by 
Western influence. Combined with an 
extremist view of Islam which denies 
women many rights, this has proven 
to be a persuasive ideology. If Boko 
Haram want to gain support, they 
have two equally viable paths: reli-
gious and economic. To the millions 
of poor Muslims living in northern 
igeria, seeing the Christians in the 
south gaining wealth and impo ing 
heavy-handed policies from afar can 
create significant resentment and an-
ger. Such resentment results in a huge 
pool of candidates for potential rad-
icalization and recruitment. Indeed, 
the success of Boko Haram's ten-year 
insurgency, still showing no sign of 
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abating, is testament to how power-
fully their message resonates within an 
environment of longstanding religious 
tensions, unequal wealth distribution, 
and international-led development. 
CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA 
The ongoing conflict in the Niger 
Delta region of igeria, variable in 
intensity but fairly constant since the 
late 1990s, revolves around control of 
the region's extensive oil deposits. As 
Africa's largest oil producer, Nigeria's 
economy is dominated by petrodol-
lars: 92% of their foreign exchange 
earnings come from oil, for a total of 
$340 billion annually. 12 90% of this 
oil is extracted from the iger Delta, 
making it the center of an incredibly 
lucrative industry. 13 However, wide-
spread inequality is present even within 
the generally more affiuent regions of 
the Delta, with 70% of the population 
living on less than a dollar a day. 14 In 
addition, this densely populated region 
(265 people/km2) is home to roughly 
30 million people from over 40 differ-
ent ethnic groups speaking more than 
100 languages. 15 
When oil giants, Royal Dutch Shell 
and Chevron, began investing exten-
sively in oil extraction in the iger 
Delta during the 1970s and 80s, they 
relied on their government partners to 
acquire land for them to operate on, 
usually without residents' consent or 
adequate compensation. In response, 
the Ogoni ethnic group started the 
nonviolent Movement for the Surviv-
al of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 
1990 to protest the appropriation and 
exploitation of their land. In spite of violent suppression by 
Nigeria's security forces, MOSOP remained peaceful until 
1995 when, with the cooperation of Shell, the then-current 
milita_ry junta regime framed and executed its top leader-
ship. MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa's last words before 
he was hanged were "You can kill the messenger, but you 
cannot kill the message," a warning that time has since prov-
en prophetic. 16 
While the Ogoni were by far the most prominent eth-
nic group speaking out against the oil industry's oppression, 
they were not the only ones: the ljaws, ltserikis, Urhobos, 
Isikos, Liages, lkwerres, Ekpeyes, and Ogulaghas all object-
ed to the ongoing status quo of oil production. 17 The iger 
Delta wetlands, their ancestral home as well as a vibrant 
ecosystem with incredible biodiversity, had been devastated 
by the negative environmental externalities of oil drilling. 
Polluted water, damaged habitat, and reduced :fish stocks 
were common symptoms of this degradation. 18 Furthermore, 
despite the massive profits reaped by the oil companies and 
the Nigerian government, very little wealth had entered lo-
cal communities. After the initial government crackdown, 
armed militias began to form in the Delta, often along tribal 
lines. These militias funded themselves by stealing oil from 
pipelines to sell on the open market, kidnapping oil industry 
workers for ransom, and committing piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea. They fought not only government security forces 
but other militias as well, usually over control of oil prof-
its. However, as oil companies are well versed in operating 
under hostile conditions, this situation was considered nei-
ther unusual nor unacceptable and the conflict remained 
low-intensity.19 
The emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the iger Delta (ME D) in 2006 represented a radical 
break from these trends. Operating more like a traditional 
terrorist network, ME D utilized numerous independent 
cells and sophisticated tactics along with equipment like 
speedboats, body armor, and RPGs. Rather than simply 
raiding the oil industry for money or trying to get them off 
of tribal lands, ME D wanted to completely eliminate for-
eign presence in the industry by any means necessary. Any 
target related to the oil industry was considered fair game. 
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MEND began attacking offshore platforms and facilities 
and killing, instead of ransoming, kidnapped workers. These 
terror tactics made a significant impact, costing the govern-
ment billions of dollars in lost oil revenue and forcing them 
to come to the negotiating table after a military solution to 
the problem proved to be impossible. MEND eventually 
ceased operations in 2009, after the government agreed to 
pay them millions of dollars, grant them amnesty, and release 
their leader and founder, Henry Okah, from prison. 10 
The 2010 election of Goodluck Jonathan, the Christian 
president despised by Boko Haram, signaled a detente in 
the conflict. Hailing from the Niger Delta, Jonathan was 
considered more sympathetic to the Delta residents than 
previous administrations. However, the subsequent 2015 
election of northern Muslim Muhammadu Buhari, a former 
junta leader, signaled a worsening of relations, in part due 
to rumors that he planned to scrap the amnesty agreement 
with MEND. This led to the most recent phase of the con-
flict in 2016, when the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), a new 
player, emerged. With the same goals and tactics as MEND, 
NDA was extremely successful; Nigeria's oil exports hit a 
25-year low in 2016, primarily due to infrastructure dam-
age to the industry. Recently, more insurgent groups have 
emerged with goals that include the restoration of Biafra, 
the former secessionist state which encompasses most of the 
Niger Delta region. The current insurgency, much like Boko 
Haram, shows no sign of abating.21 
WHAT ROLE DOES GLOBALIZATION PLAY? 
Both of these ongoing conflicts are united by their status 
as ideological backlashes to the impacts of globalization. 
Boko Haram is associated with both cultural globalization 
and economic globalization, while the iger Delta Conflict 
is primarily associated with economic globalization. 
Boko Haram is strictly defined, both within their own 
ideology and within popular consciousness, by one thing 
only: Western education is forbidden. It is revealing that 
they chose Western education and not Women's education. 
Although Boko Haram's tactics certainly involve denying 
women access to education, their overall strategy is con-
cerned with the influence of the West who they see as the 
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enablers for the imposition of such in-
tolerable conditions. Perhaps the Nige-
rian government would have chosen to 
fight for women's education of its own 
accord, but, due to the pervasive influ-
ence of foreign benefactors, it is impos-
sible to ascertain who did or did not 
have a role in making specific policies. 
This ambiguity lends itself well 
to Boko Haram's ideology and pro-
paganda. The imposition of modern 
cultural norms such as women's right 
to education becomes seen as an in-
trusion of the hostile West-the same 
malevolent force which has enriched 
and empowered the opposite religious 
faction at the expense of poor Muslims 
in northern Nigeria. On the other side 
of the issue, those in the West who 
see women's education in Nigeria as 
a moral imperative and condemn at-
tempts to halt its spread are guilty of 
moral universalism. Moral universal-
ism occurs when individuals or groups 
assume their specific moral beliefs or 
societal norms are the "right" ones and 
are widely shared. 
The iger Delta Conflict is also 
defined by a single issue: oil. The ex-
traction of Nigeria's oil by foreign firms 
for sale in international markets is an 
excellent example of economic glo-
balization, as it involves transnational 
movement of personnel, currency, and 
raw materials; foreign direct invest-
ment; and governmental cooperation 
with multinational corporations. The 
iger Delta residents feel that the in-
fluence of igeria's oil industry and its 
foreign actors has marginalized their 
own voices and concerns. Westerners 
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are making decisions in distant board-
rooms about what happens on Nige-
rian soil, expecting the Nigerian gov-
ernment to enforce whatever policies 
they decide will be most advantageous 
to their shareholders. This chips away 
at the government's sovereignty, even if 
they are a willing partner. 
Indeed, since igeria's economy 
depends on oil profits, the government 
has taken a very proactive role in pro-
moting interests of the oil industry. The 
violent suppression of the nonviolent 
movements in the 1990s, as opposed 
to the peace talks employed once the 
insurgency became effective at creating 
significant financial losses, indicates 
that the revenue streams of the oil in-
dustry are a more powerful motivating 
factor for policy than the rights and 
opinions of their own citizens. 
The emergence of MEND and the 
move from a greed-based to griev-
ance-based model of fighting clearly 
reflected a shift in the primary goal 
of the conflict following the events of 
the previous decade. What started as 
a peaceful movement for greater lo-
calized control of oil extraction had 
become a violent and well-organized 
insurgency that would settle for noth-
ing less than the complete removal of 
exploitative foreign firms from the oil 
industry. By allowing the demands of 
foreign actors to guide domestic policy, 
the igerian government has created 
generations of bitter enemies, desta-
bilized their already tenuous security 
situation, inflicted incalculable envi-
ronmental damage, and suffered sig-
nificant loss of autonomy. The ongoing 
insurgency and revived idea of Biafran 
independence now present a threat 
to igeria's territorial sovereignty; a 
threat which could have been avoided 
through better governance and inclu-
sive institutions. 
CONCLUSION 
One by-product of igeria's eco-
nomic growth in recent decades has 
been a backlash to the unequal de-
velopment deepening divisions with-
in the country. Extremist movements 
like Boko Haram and the NDA, de-
spite their violent and abhorrent meth-
ods, are attempting to address legiti-
mate grievances brought about by the 
complex and asymmetric interactions 
between Western-led economic devel-
opment and Nigeria's socioeconomic 
environment. Given the patterns seen 
in the past several decades, it may be 
impossible for the processes of glo-
balization to occur without a certain 
amount of violent pushback. 
However, this pushback does not 
mean that nothing can be done to mit-
igate such conflicts. Boko Haram is a 
vexing problem to solve; they have a 
very narrow ideological goal which is 
not supported by public opinion, and 
they are unlikely to negotiate on it. Ef-
fective counterinsurgency is the most 
likely path to improving the situation, 
paired with inclusive economic initia-
tives to reduce the income disparity 
between igerian Muslims and Chris-
tians and thereby defuse religions ten-
sions. However, in the case of the iger 
Delta conflict, it is entirely conceivable 
that multilateral negotiations between 
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Developing countries is a technical term 
in political science denoting a country 
in which a large share of the population 
cannot meet or experiences great difficulties 
in meeting basic material needs such as 
housing, food, water, health care, education, 
electricity, transport, communications, and 
physical security 




the oil companies, the government, 
and the residents could produce some 
positive results. The emergence of more 
hardline groups like ME D and NDA 
is relatively recent; for decades, all the 
citizens of the iger Delta wanted 
was to have a voice in how the nat-
ural resources of their homeland were 
extracted and how the profits were 
distributed. 
Four key trends and recommenda-
tions stand out from analyzing these 
two conflicts using the Method of 
Agreement. First, states should be 
willing to peacefully negotiate on do-
mestic issues caused by globalization 
before violence breaks out, not after-
wards. Second, MNCs must be more 
aware of and more responsive to how 
their actions impact domestic politics 
in developing countries. Third, IOs 
and NGOs must acknowledge that 
progressive development policies will 
often be met with pushback, and some 
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of this pushback will inevitably be violent. Finally, and most 
importantly, improving economic prospects for the Nigeri-
ans at risk of being radicalized will improve security pros-
pects immensely. While there will always be a minority of 
insurgents who fight for ideological reasons, the majority 
of people (specifically, unemployed young men) who join 
insurgencies do so because they have no job prospects and 
therefore no chances for acquiring wealth and a better life. 
Better economic conditions will reduce the pool of people 
available for radicalization while giving the state additional 
tax revenue to combat the reduced insurgents that remain. 
While well-entrenched, well-motivated insurgencies may 
seem like they will never be defeated, recent history has 
shown this is not the case. ISIS (The Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria) lost their Caliphate. FARC (The Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Columbia) disarmed and became a legit-
imate political party. As more people find their traditional 
lifestyles and livelihoods threatened by globalization, there 
will doubtlessly be more extremist groups seeking to ex-
ploit these conditions for their own purposes. In order to 
successfully address this threat, it is imperative for actors 
at every level of the economy to take steps to reduce the 
appeal of extremist ideology. Governments of developing 
countries need to establish strong and fair institutions to 
address the many legitimate grievances globalization and 
economic development cause. Citizens must continue to 
organize, make their voices heard peacefully, and reject any 
ideology, no matter how righteous, that includes violence. 
Finally, M Cs must understand that sustainable, equita-
ble, and inclusive development will create long-term ben-
efits for all actors involved. How many more barrels of oil 
would Shell be exporting from Nigeria right now if they had 
worked with the Ogoni People, instead of against them, in 
developing the iger Delta oil fields? How many more Shell 
employees and Delta residents would still be alive? While 
there is no universal solution to the manifold challenges 
that globalization presents, switching from a short-term to a 
long-term view of economic development, and including all 
stakeholders in negotiations as fully empowered parties, will 
help insure that growth becomes more equitable, sustainable, 
and reduces the appeal of extremist ideology. 
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